“End Nuclear Insanity Before Nuclear Insanity Ends Humanity” ~llaw

May 29, 2025

(See Bulletin of Atomic Scientists article below for image description and photo credit ~llaw)
LLAW’s NUCLEAR WORLD NEWS TODAY and the GLOBAL RISKS & CONSEQUENCES TOMORROW
In My Opinion:
This article’s subject —the 3rd I’ve recently Posted here — is about the dismal past and future of Trump’s so-called “Golden Dome” nuclear defense shield that may well be the biggest “white elephant” ever created by the USA, but that is not all.
Besides the issue of throwing good money after bad, this article from “The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists” also tells us another story, and that is Trump and his administration are ignoring existing technology, that is documented in this long, but excellent article, and this typical failure of Trump’s presidency is the most important quote of all, and it comes with details:
“Everything we have learned about missile defense over the last 50 years is being ignored by the Trump administration.”
~llaw

Nuclear expert Jon Wolfsthal on the costs of US nuclear weapons programs spiraling out of control
By François Diaz-Maurin | May 29, 2025

Photo illustration by Thomas Gaulkin (Trident missile photo by US Navy)
Just as the US House of Representatives passed its so-called “big, beautiful bill” last week, offering large tax cuts to the wealthy and kicking millions off their health insurance, President Trump announced that his administration would invest $175 billion over three years in a “Golden Dome” missile defense project that would, purportedly, protect the United States against any missile attack, small or large. This new defense program adds to an already long list of programs for the modernization and replacement of all US strategic nuclear delivery and associated systems.
Currently estimated at about $1 trillion over the next 10 years, the nuclear modernization program has faced technical and management challenges, leading to repeated cost and schedule overruns. These overruns are so large that they triggered a breach of the Nunn-McCurdy Act, which requires Congress to be notified when defense programs exceed certain cost thresholds. There have been two such notifications recently: First in January 2024 for the new Sentinel intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) and a second time in April for the radar modernization program of the latest configuration of the B-52 bomber. And the new Columbia-class ballistic missile submarine could trigger another breach: According to a September 2024 Government Accountability Office report, difficulties with the construction of the lead submarine may result in cost overruns that are nearly five times the Navy’s initial estimates.
To help make sense of the cost problem affecting all three legs of the US nuclear arsenal’s modernization, I spoke with Jon Wolfsthal, a nuclear expert and director of global risk at the Federation of American Scientists. Wolfsthal, who is a member of the Bulletin’s Science and Security Board, has studied this issue for over a decade. Earlier this month, he wrote an article for the Federation of American Scientists in which he says the costs “continue to spiral out of control.”
Our conversation has been edited for length and clarity.
François Diaz-Maurin: I want to start by asking: Why did you write about the cost issue of the US nuclear weapons programs now?
Diaz-Maurin: I guess most of our readers already know that nuclear weapons are costly. But that’s not exactly what your piece is about. It’s rather that the costs are, as you say, spiraling out of control. What do you mean by that? Could you break down a bit what’s happening with those costs?
Wolfsthal: When I first looked at this issue back in 2009, after I entered the Obama administration, it was clear that the Bush administration had not been investing money to maintain a safe arsenal; they had diverted money away from stockpile surveillance, which are basic, non-controversial steps to maintain a safe arsenal. So President Obama and Vice President Biden immediately took steps to make sure we were keeping our weapons safe by investing more money in a program that wasn’t necessarily part of the Prague agenda. It was just common sense: You don’t want weapons to be neglected. You don’t want them to risk going off, and you don’t want to have to risk having to return to nuclear testing.
But in 2010, President Obama made a series of commitments in order to convince the Senate to approve the New START treaty. And at that time, he committed to spending $88 billion over 10 years to modernize the arsenal. When I left government in 2012, it was already clear that the full scope of that modernization was going to be much bigger, but nobody had ever looked at exactly what that scope was going to be. And so, Jeff Lewis and I, along with our research assistant at [the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies in] Monterey did that first analysis in 2014. And we came up with the number, based on the government’s own estimates, that it would cost $1 trillion over 30 years to modernize the [US nuclear] arsenal and maintain what we had.
At the time, we were criticized as being alarmist, anti-nuclear, padding the budget, and trying to attack the sustainment program. And there were also comments, and this is in the piece, that people said: “This is affordable. It’s a small fraction of the defense budget, and it’s historically very low.” They looked at what modernization had cost during the Reagan administration, and it was about 6 percent of the defense budget at the time. So, for them, this was going to be less than that.
Now, fast forward to the [April] report by the Congressional Budget Office, not only is $1 trillion low for a 30-year estimate, but we’re going to spend a trillion dollars in 10 years, because all of these programs turned out to be vastly more complicated and vastly more expensive. This is partly because of political decisions made by the first Trump administration to award these contracts before they were mature, to single-source contractors, and to bite off more than the defense industrial complex could chew. First, we have the [Sentinel] ICBM program, with an initial estimate of about $60 to $70 billion now running above $140 billion. Then, the B-21 bomber program is classified.[1] It was classified at the request of the late Senator John McCain. Therefore, we don’t even know what those budget costs are. And, quite frankly, I think the Congressional Budget Office probably underestimates what those costs are, because the Air Force has always wanted to exclude research and development costs.
Then, the [Columbia-class] submarine has been delayed for a number of reasons. I think that has probably less to do with programmatic mismanagement than with just real shortfalls in our defense industrial complex. And I don’t have the numbers right in front of me in terms of the sub growth, but there’s no doubt that the ICBM has been the poster child for cost overruns.
And then there was just a report in April that the B-52, the current nuclear bomber, has actually breached the Nunn-McCurdy guidelines, because it has exceeded the allowed cost overruns and is now considered an at-risk program. So the cost issue is not unique to any one program. The problem is that the Defense Department is trying to modernize every leg of the US nuclear deterrent at the same time, while also trying to build next-generation fighters and attack submarines, and to deal with repairs that are to the defense industrial base on the conventional side. But it just can’t do it all, and things are going to get more and more expensive.
When scientists and weather forecasters are targeted, everyone loses
Diaz-Maurin: You mentioned the B-52 bomber breaching the Nunn-McCurdy Act, which requires that the military services notify Congress when a program exceeds its appropriated cost or schedule. Last year, the Sentinel ICBM program also breached the Nunn-McCurdy Act with an unprecedented 37 percent growth in budget compared to previous estimates and at least a two-year schedule delay. But as far as I can know, nothing happened, and the program is likely to proceed. Does it mean that Congress has no say ultimately over such breaches?
Wolfsthal: Well, these are always questions of political will. Congress passed a law and under the Biden administration, the Nunn-McCurdy Act was followed. [After a breach], it requires the Defense Department to recertify that there are no alternatives for the program and that the necessary steps are being taken to move money from one part of the defense budget to meet the shortfall and to put the program on sound footing. In this case, it was the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisitions and Sustainment [William LaPlante] who certified the program under [Defense Secretary] Lloyd Austin and determined that there was no alternative, which I don’t believe to be true. Now we know that the Minuteman III can be extended. So that’s the alternative.[2]
Any assurances that the program was being put on sound footing are now completely blown away by the fact that they’re not even sure what silos they’re going to have: Do they need all new silos? Can they repurpose old silos like they’re going back to the drawing board on silos? Congress should take that certification and analyze it. Part of the problem is that the Nunn-McCurdy justification is classified and has not been released. In fact, the Federation of American Scientists has submitted a FOIA request for the Nunn-McCurdy certification, because we’d like to know what analysis went into trying to comply with the law. But as we’ve seen in this environment, the law is what judges say it is, and Congress would have to stand up for its political and legal rights, because they’re not going to just be handed them by the Trump administration.
Diaz-Maurin: What’s the alternative to the Sentinel ICBM program, exactly? And, generally speaking, are all nuclear modernization programs equally necessary for national security?
Wolfsthal: Those are exactly the right questions. And what we appear to be doing is saying, “we made a decision 10 years ago, and it’s impossible to revisit those decisions, and we have to keep doing this no matter what.” But that’s not the way nuclear strategy should be run, and the fact that they haven’t revisited basic concepts suggests to me that they’re just not interested in or capable of doing the hard work of managing this arsenal.
If the President determines—which is his right—that we need to maintain 400 warheads on ICBMs, there are lots of ways we can do that. During the Obama administration in 2016, we suggested that you could take the 200 most reliable Minuteman IIIs and simply put two warheads on each of them. You would cut the reliability risk of the ICBM program significantly, because you could take the most reliable, most modern of the Minuteman IIIs and maintain two warheads on each. This wouldn’t risk inviting an attack because Russia or China would still have to strike at 200 fixed land targets. So, you still would have the sponge and a very visible deterrent.[3] But that was rejected by the Air Force as unworkable, even though it turns out the Sentinel program is also unworkable.
Still, there are alternatives. For instance, could the United States go back to the drawing board and develop mobile ICBMs? Could the United States build a new ICBM, but fewer of them? Could the United States simply upload warheads to submarines and have fewer ICBMs? Back in 2018, there was an analysis done by Global Zero called “Alternative Nuclear Posture Review,” which talked about going to a [nuclear] dyad, with submarines and bombers only. So, there are lots of ways by which the United States could maintain a very robust nuclear deterrent and fighting force without having to spend $140 billion plus on a new ICBM, which likely will not be deployed for more than a decade, which I think is even a very optimistic timeline.
Diaz-Maurin: Going back to your piece, you seem to describe a systemic inability by the Defense Department to meet budget and schedule for its nuclear programs. What can be done to improve oversight of those programs?
Wolfsthal: These are hard things to do. It’s not as if I am sitting in a nice non-governmental office without government responsibility and saying that this is easy. These programs are difficult. But this is why we suggested in 2014 that these things are so hard; we shouldn’t be doing them all at the same time. Stagger them. Invest. Do the submarine first, because the submarine is necessary. They’re stabilizing. The defense capacity is there. Then, if you’re going to do the bomber, you know there are explanations for why you might want to do the conventional bomber first. Maybe you want to delay that program somewhat. But when it comes to the ICBM, this program could easily have been pushed out another decade.
I still think that there are lots of good reasons to say, especially if you’re going to have to extend the life of the Minuteman IIIs anyway: Stop the Sentinel program. Go back to the drawing board. Reevaluate how many warheads you need, which we’re going to have to do anyway as New START goes away. And then, figure out what’s the best, most reliable way to maintain those capabilities. Maybe that is a new ICBM, maybe that’s mobile, maybe it’s fixed. But buy yourself the five years necessary to figure out how to do this program, and in the meantime, get some of these other programs on a sound footing, because the same people that are managing the finances, the defense industrial base, the contracting, the long-lead-term procurement items, the defense contractors are doing all these programs. But there’s just only so much time in the day, and we’re facing now a trillion-dollar defense budget annually that is still not capable of doing the basic things that most people would say are necessary: maintaining a well-equipped, motivated military force, taking care of their health, buying modern communication, command, and control equipment, building resiliency, preparing for the future of warfare (whether it’s AI, cyber, non-kinetic), all those different things.
Very few people think that nuclear weapons are the most important thing that the Defense Department is doing. These weapons are, in many people’s views, necessary, but not the most important. And so, how do we right-size this investment? Maybe you stop some of the programs, and maybe you slow some of them down. But right now, there is no strategic prioritization taking place within the Defense Department. I don’t think that [Defense] Secretary Hegseth has a knowledge base on these issues, nor do I think that the people that he’s brought in under him have any experience with managing these nuclear systems. And the White House is not exercising control in that area. Therefore, the only option is for Congress to step up, and for the expert community, the civil society community, the Congressional Budget Offices of the world, to draw attention to this issue, to try to create momentum for some sound analysis and changes to put these programs on a better footing.
The US hypocrisy about Israel’s nuclear weapons must stop
Diaz-Maurin: Let me play a little devil’s advocate here. Whenever there is a congressional hearing about threat assessment, you get experts and military officials testifying that the United States urgently needs to upgrade all three legs of its nuclear arsenal at the same time to respond to China’s growing nuclear ambitions and the likely end of strategic arms control with Russia. In their view, the full nuclear modernization program is a necessary insurance policy for national security. What would you tell them?
Wolfsthal: I would say that right now we have five legs of a nuclear arsenal, not three. We have submarines, ICBMs, and bombers, but we also have long-range cruise missiles and tactical (non-strategic) nuclear weapons. So, the United States already has more than a triad. What’s at risk is not whether we can maintain a nuclear deterrent, but whether we can maintain an effective nuclear deterrent by trying to buy new systems that will not be delivered on time, will not have the operational capability that they were originally designed to have, and that we will end up in disarmament or reductions either by default or by mismanagement. Therefore, the choice before us is not to maintain a great arsenal or to develop a super great arsenal. It is whether we can define a pathway to maintain a reasonable arsenal that can deter our adversaries and protect our allies, or whether we are going to drop off a cliff because we cannot effectively manage these programs. And that’s not me arguing that we can live with fewer nuclear weapons. It’s simply that we need a strategy. We then need to put capabilities and resources to work to achieve that strategy, be mindful about it, and be effective at it.
In 2009, I drafted part of the Prague speech for President Obama, and people tend to look only at one part of that speech or the other, but they rarely read the whole thing. What Obama said is that we should recommit ourselves to a world without nuclear weapons. But so long as nuclear weapons exist, they need to be safe, secure, and effective. Those two things go hand in hand, and right now, we’re on a pathway to neither pursue a world without nuclear weapons nor maintain a safe and effective nuclear arsenal. And as a result, we risk not getting either, and that is a recipe for real danger.
Diaz-Maurin: When we go back to the reliability issue across the legs, it all comes down to the reliability of the plutonium pits, the explosive core of nuclear weapons. As part of the US nuclear modernization, the Energy Department’s National Nuclear Security Administration has launched an ambitious program to produce new plutonium pits at Los Alamos National Laboratory in New Mexico and the Savannah River Site in South Carolina. But this program, too, is facing cost overruns and production challenges. What’s your view about this program?
Wolfsthal: First, I still rely on the 2006 study that was done by the JASON [advisory group], which concluded that our pits are likely to be reliable for at least 100 years. What this comes down to, however, is not the internal perceived reliability of an individual pit, or even of an individual missile or submarine. It is whether an adversary believes that the United States is capable and willing to launch nuclear weapons in response to a nuclear attack or strategic threat to the United States or its allies? Because if they do, then it doesn’t matter if our weapons are 98 percent or 94 percent reliable. It simply matters that we have influenced our adversaries and our allies so they know that the US commitment is credible.
Our biggest challenge right now is not the technical reliability of our programs. The biggest problem is that nobody believes that President Trump would ever risk the security of the United States to protect its allies, and adversaries doubt seriously whether Trump would even launch US nuclear weapons in response to an attack by Russia or China because he’s trying to cut economic deals with as much as he is trying to deter them. So our problems are not going to be fixed financially. They need to be fixed politically.
Now, to the extent that we will need nuclear weapons to be credible until we can achieve some more stable outcome, we need to make sure we are not wasting money and spending these funds and scarce resources on programs that aren’t going to build what they are designed to build. Unfortunately, that’s pretty much what we are doing right now. We are not only trying to build an aircraft while we are flying it. We’re trying to build an aircraft while it’s doing a nosedive into the ground, and the trajectory is already set. The first rule of hole digging when you’re in one is to stop digging. And any reasonable analyst would look at the Sentinel ICBM program and say, “This has to go back to the drawing board.”
Diaz-Maurin: One final question before I wrap up this interview. President Trump just announced his plan to build a so-called Golden Dome missile defense project in three years at a cost of no more than $175 billion. Past the feasibility of building such a complex system in so little time, what do you make of its cost estimate?
Wolfsthal: Everything we have learned about missile defense over the last 50 years is being ignored by the Trump administration. Their estimates are easily off by an order of magnitude, and any protection they provide will be so limited as to be almost insignificant. Moreover, pursuing a Golden Dome missile defense will drive our adversaries to build more missiles, more maneuverable missiles, and rely on decoys, enabling them to render any national defense ineffective. These funds would be much better spent on other defense and non-defense priorities. The idea that we will build any kind of effective defense in the next three years is simply a fantasy.
Notes
[1] The B-21 bomber is expected to enter service by 2027 to gradually replace the B-1B and B-2 bombers through the 2030s. In total, the Air Force is expected to procure at least 100 B-21 bombers.
[2] Some current Minuteman III ICBMs will likely have to be life-extended to make up for the delay in the new Sentinel ICBM program.
[3] The “nuclear sponge” is a concept that illustrates how silos would absorb hundreds of Russian (or Chinese) missiles and warheads to destroy the United States’ ICBM silos before these adversaries can launch an attack on other targets.
ABOUT THE FOLLOWING ACCESS TO “LLAW’s ALL NUCLEAR DAILY DIGEST” RELATED MEDIA
There are 7 categories, with the latest addition, (#7) being a Friday weekly roundup of IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) global nuclear news stories. Also included is a bonus non-nuclear category for news about the Yellowstone caldera and other volcanic and caldera activity around the world that play an important role in humanity’s lives. The feature categories provide articles and information about ‘all things nuclear’ for you to pick from, usually with up to 3 links with headlines concerning the most important media stories in each category, but sometimes fewer and occasionally even none (especially so with the Yellowstone Caldera). The Categories are listed below in their usual order:
- All Things Nuclear
- Nuclear Power
- Nuclear Power Emergencies
- Nuclear War Threats
- Nuclear War
- Yellowstone Caldera & Other Volcanoes (Note: There are three Yellowstone Caldera bonus stories available in today’s Post.)
- IAEA Weekly News (Friday’s only)
Whenever there is an underlined link to a Category media news story, if you press or click on the link provided, you no longer have to cut and paste to your web browser, since this Post’s link will take you directly to the article in your browser.
A current Digest of major nuclear media headlines with automated links is listed below by nuclear Category (in the above listed order). If a Category heading does not appear in the daily news Digest, it means there was no news reported from this Category today. Generally, the three best articles in each Category from around the nuclear world(s) are Posted. Occasionally, if a Post is important enough, it may be listed in multiple Categories.
TODAY’s NUCLEAR WORLD’s NEWS DIGEST, Thursday, (05/29/2025)
All Things Nuclear
NEWS
Site of America’s worst nuclear accident gets new chance to become energy hub – PBS
PBS
We’re sorry to interrupt your regular programs, but we have been waiting all evening to go to Harrisburg, Pennsylvania. … about nuclear energy …
Iranian political analyst discusses latest talks with U.S. on a new nuclear deal – NPR
NPR
Beyond that, everything else is solvable. But the problem is that inside the United States, you have the neocons and the Zionist lobby, which have …
Nuclear expert Jon Wolfsthal on the costs of US nuclear weapons programs spiraling out of control
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists
Wolfsthal: Everything we have learned about missile defense over the last 50 years is being ignored by the Trump administration. Their estimates are …
Nuclear Power
NEWS
Trump’s Nuclear Order Could Loosen Radiation Standards, Give DOGE Expanded Role – Barron’s
Barron’s
The shuttered Three Mile Island nuclear power plant near Middletown, Pa. Constellation Energy is looking to give the site new life. (Chip ..
Trump nuclear orders could open small reactors by 2030: GE Vernova – CNBC
CNBC
President Donald Trump ordered the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to decide on applications for new nuclear plants within 18 months.
Nuclear Making a Comeback in US, Europe | OilPrice.com
Oil Price
European nations such as Denmark, Spain, and Germany are signaling renewed openness to advanced reactor technologies. Nuclear power plant. The …
Nuclear Power Emergencies
NEWS
Constellation to test emergency sirens at Peach Bottom nuclear plant – York Dispatch
York Dispatch
Constellation will conduct its semi-annual, full-volume test of the emergency warning sirens surrounding Peach Bottom Clean Energy Center, …
Koeberg emergency siren inadvertently activated during routine maintenance
Engineering News
Power utility Eskom on May 28 confirmed that an emergency siren was … NUCLEAR ENERGY BACK. Koeberg emergency siren inadvertently activated …
Operational event at Taishan Nuclear Power Station – Government Information Centre
Government Information Centre
The Nuclear Emergency Committee Office of the Guangdong Province notified the Security Bureau today (May 29) of an operational event at Taishan …
Nuclear War Threats
NEWS
War of words: New sanctions threat in US-Russia escalation – YouTube
YouTube
Russia warns Trump to ‘back off’ from Ukraine with threats of WWIII. Sky … Putin’s nuclear war would have fatal impacts for Russia | Former …
Nordic nations embrace total defense as the risk of sabotage and war rises – ABC News
ABC News – The Walt Disney Company
The Nordic nations are embracing the concept of total defense, mobilizing the whole of society to defend against military and non-military threats …
US seeks to shield likely nuclear deal with Tehran from threat of Israeli attack | | AW
The Arab Weekly
US seeks to shield likely nuclear deal with Tehran from threat of Israeli attack. The US move to prevent Israeli interference with the negotiated …
Nuclear War
NEWS
Israel threatens to attack Iran amid U.S. ongoing nuclear negotiations – YouTube
YouTube
Tensions in the Middle East rise after U.S. President Donald Trump seeks agreements with the Iranian government, while Israel raises possible …
Putin’s nuclear war would have fatal impacts for Russia | Former UK defence attaché to Moscow
YouTube
Russia doesn’t want to go down that path, it wants to keep war away from its soil.” John Foreman tells Times Radio Frontline’s Philip Ingram why …
How Russia is reacting after Trump threatens Putin with more sanctions – YouTube
YouTube
14:54 · Go to channel. Putin’s nuclear war would have fatal impacts for Russia | Former UK defence attaché to Moscow. Times Radio New 3.4K views · 8: …
Yellowstone Caldera
NEWS
Camera monitors Black Diamond Pool for Volcano Observatory – Billings Gazette
Billings Gazette
Temporary camera provides view of explosive Yellowstone pool · May 28, 2025 · 6 hrs ago · 0.
Watch mesmerizing 1,000-foot-tall lava fountains: Kilauea volcano erupting in ways not seen …
Live Science
… Yellowstone supervolcano · Planet Earth · Volcanos. Watch mesmerizing 1,000-foot-tall lava fountains: Kilauea volcano erupting in ways not seen for 40 …
Mohave County Geology: Why some volcanoes explode and others just flow – Havasu News
Havasu News
The recent spectacular eruptions of the Hawaii volcano are awe inspiring and show the awesome power of the Earth … Yellowstone Caldera · Volcanic …