End Nuclear Insanity Before Nuclear Insanity Ends Humanity” ~llaw

Lloyd A. Williams-Pendergraft

Jan 16, 2025

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LLAW’s NUCLEAR WORLD NEWS TODAY with THE RISKS & CONSEQUENCES OF TOMORROW

There are three excellent Trump/Nuclear warning stories in TODAY’s NUCLEAR WORLD’s NEWS section of this daily blog posted below. I urge you to read all three, but I have selected the following one for instant reading, consideration, and discussion in this critical post section for today.

I begin my critique here with a quote from the headlines of the 2nd and 34d articles of choice, which are relevant to the following “Bulleting of the Atomic Scientists” article posted just below.

Trump should not be allowed by congress to have sole possession of purpose of the nuclear football. This is critical to the future of not only the United States but also the entire world, clearly pointed out by the headline from “The Nuclear Threat Initiative” (NTI) story: “A Second Grip on the Nuclear Football: “Rethinking Sole Authority in a Volatile World” linked below, adamantly stating that Trump cannot have sole power over the decision to start a nuclear war. This should be mandatory and current President Joe Biden can still prevent such a possibility that will become a reality on Monday of next week (January 20th. The importance of this action before Trump’s inauguration cannot be overstated.

The 3rd article of significance is from the concerns of Europe and the members of NATO, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, of which The U.S. is a member, but for how long will we be so? That headline goes like this from the University of Leicester:

Professor Futter highlights a concern that Trump may undermine or weaken the US link with NATO

From the article: Professor Futter said: “There’s real concern across Europe, not so much that Trump has his finger on the button and might start a nuclear war, but that he might somehow undermine NATO. The US is so integral to European security. By saying things off-the-cuff, like ‘we won’t support allies that don’t pay for their security’, or doing a deal with Putin over Ukraine, or if he decides to pull US forces from a particular location – Trump create significant problems in Europe, because European security is entirely premised on the US undergirding it.”

My words: The fear that Trump will use Ukraine as a scapegoat by arbitrarily ending their war with Russia in order to pacify Putin and perhaps force Ukraine to return to the USSR is a legitimate fear for NATO countries.

All in all, this transition of the United States’ leadership and, deservedly, the so-called leader of the free world puts America at risk in a global situation never seen before and most likely will never be seen again. We will have an unstable president who is old, evidently a bit senile, and often mentally deranged. The entire world is at risk of actions that Trump may singularly, with his questionable administration, attempt to ”rule” the world with nuclear threats or even nuclear war. Such a possibility has every other country, if not the U.S. itself, leery and concerned about their future well-being. ~llaw

Three nuclear policy challenges for the second Trump administration

By Stephen J. Cimbala, Lawrence J. Korb | January 16, 2025

Peter Linforth/Pixabay

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The incoming Trump administration will have to deal with many challenges in domestic and foreign policy, including threats and dangers related to nuclear weapons, deterrence, and arms control. Three nuclear challenges will prove particularly difficult to address: Russia’s repeated threats of nuclear first use in Ukraine and their relationship to viable endgames for that conflict; Iran’s status as a threshold nuclear weapons state and its implications for regional stability; and the emergence of a Chinese nuclear superpower and its implications for global security.

The policies adopted and decisions made during the second Trump administration will involve the fate of the war in Europe, nuclear proliferation in the Middle East, and China’s nuclear arsenal. If they incorporate military and diplomatic tools properly, those policies and decisions could open the door to a more peaceful and stable world. But in the absence of a balanced and thoughtful approach, the door may open wide to a world of continued war, nuclear weapons proliferation, and worldwide arms racing.

Russia’s nuclear threats. Russian President Vladimir Putin has repeatedly reminded Ukraine, the United States, and the other NATO members of Russia’s large inventory of nuclear weapons. He also warned them that, under certain circumstances, Russia would not hesitate to use these weapons.

Some Western government officials and policy experts have dismissed Putin’s warnings about the possibility of nuclear first use as saber-rattling or bluffs. But, according to its military doctrine, Russia could resort to nuclear first use if Russia—or its allies—were attacked with nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction. In addition, an attack with conventional weapons threatening Russia’s survival would also justify a nuclear response. Recent adjustments to Russian nuclear doctrine have extended the scenarios under which Russia might feel justified in using nuclear weapons. These scenarios include attacks on Russian territory with deep-strike weapons by a non-nuclear state that is supported by a nuclear power. The obvious reference is to Ukraine which is supported by NATO.^[1]

On the other hand, Putin has also asserted that Russia does not need to use nuclear weapons to prevail against Ukraine. Russia’s advantage in manpower and war material for a prolonged war of attrition are obvious. Yet, this edge is not without constraints. Putin has been reluctant to order another large-scale mobilization, preferring to offer sizable bonuses for enlistment. He has intensified his attacks against Ukraine’s infrastructure, and Russian troops in the Donbas province continue to push forward on several fronts against stiff resistance. Putin has even turned to North Korea for thousands of ground troops. One irony of this situation is that Putin wants to appear as formidable as possible prior to the onset of any serious negotiations. But Russia’s partial dependency on support from North Korea—a pariah in the eyes of the international community—sends a different message.

Nuclear weapons are not only a consideration for Russian military planners.

Ukraine’s exit strategy from the conflict might also involve Kyiv’s acquisition of a nuclear deterrent against future Russian aggression in one of two ways. Ukraine might be granted NATO membership and, thereby, be included under the protection of NATO’s nuclear umbrella. If NATO membership is not possible, then Ukraine might consider acquiring its own nuclear weapons capability. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has referred to a choice between “NATO or nukes” as a possible precondition for any lasting peace agreement. In an address to the European Council meeting in Brussels in October 2024, Zelensky reminded his audience of the Budapest Memorandum of 1994, according to which Ukraine surrendered its portion of the former Soviet nuclear arsenal in return for security guarantees from the United States, Russia, and the United Kingdom.^[2]

Zelensky’s comments were provocative and possibly deliberately intended to advance his case for NATO membership as the only viable security guarantee for a postwar Ukraine. Kyiv remains officially committed to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as a non-nuclear weapons state, and major technical challenges would stand in the way of a Ukraine developing a nuclear weapons capability. As for Ukrainian membership in NATO, experts have argued both for and against it. Putin’s war against Ukraine was at least partly motivated by his perception of an intention by NATO to incorporate Ukraine. At the same time, Ukraine’s postwar position outside of NATO could be politically and militarily precarious. The Budapest Memorandum is a reminder that when prevailing international circumstances change, so do the priorities and intentions of states.

Russia’s going-in position in any negotiation for an end to the war in Ukraine will doubtless preclude either Ukrainian membership in NATO or an independent Ukrainian nuclear deterrent. However, measures might be taken to expose Russian violations of any peace agreement. These include Ukrainian membership in the European Union supported by EU guarantees against further Russian encroachment on Ukrainian territory or other Russian subversion of Ukrainian self-determination. Even though the European Union does not have the military means to enforce any agreement, it can use economic sanctions and diplomatic demarches for that purpose.

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Iran’s nuclearization. The Iranian proxy wars against Israel escalated on all fronts in 2023 and 2024—from the outbreaks of war in Gaza to Lebanon, Yemen, Syria, Iraq, and other zones of conflict. Rising tensions between Iran and the United States continued despite efforts by the Biden administration to broker cease-fire agreements with Hamas and to conciliate Iran with a possible reboot of the 2015 nuclear deal. Currently, Iran is a de facto threshold nuclear-weapons state, weeks away from the capability to fabricate an atomic bomb.

The imminent danger was not only the possibility of an Iranian first use of nuclear weapons. Once acquired and deployed, Iran could use its nuclear weapon(s) as an instrument of coercive diplomacy to support its drive for regional hegemony. An Iranian bomb could also spur other states to follow in its footsteps and imperil the nuclear non-proliferation regime even further. In addition, Iran’s close military ties with Russia and significant military support of its war against Ukraine pose a continuing threat to US and Western interests. The extended reach of Iran’s longer-range ballistic missiles could threaten military and other targets in Europe, including those located in NATO member states.

China’s nuclear rise. Last year, the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States warned that US strategy should no longer treat China’s nuclear forces as a “lesser included threat” and recommended that the United States develop a nuclear posture capable of simultaneously deterring both countries.^[3] In addition, the US Defense Department has projected a consistent pattern of improvement for China’s growing nuclear capabilities.^[4]

Robert Gates, a former US Defense Secretary under Presidents George W. Bush and Barack Obama and a former CIA director under President George H.W. Bush, warns that a rising China combined with a repolarization of international politics creates an especially challenging environment of national security threats.^[5]

As part of a year-long strategic review, the Defense Department is considering options to increase the number of nuclear weapons’ launchers and warheads. Vipin Narang, the former acting assistant secretary for space policy, noted that the United States is “exploring options to increase future launcher capacity or additional deployed warheads on the land, sea and air legs” that could offer US officials “increased flexibility, if desired, and executed.”^[6] In addition, Pranay Vaddi, a special assistant to the President and senior director for arms control, disarmament, and nonproliferation at the National Security Council, indicated that senior Biden officials would be taking a fresh look at the assumptions behind US nuclear modernization because of the changed international environment—including Russia’s efforts to develop a satellite carrying a nuclear weapon; China’s accelerated nuclear buildup; and North Korea’s continuing expansion and improvement of its nuclear ballistic missile and conventional force capabilities.^[7] In a similar fashion, the National Institute for Deterrence Studies (a US nuclear research and policy center supporting nuclear deterrence) has put forward a blueprint for US nuclear modernization based on the concept of “dynamic parity” that balances the US nuclear arsenal against the collective arsenals of Russia, China, and North Korea and suggests the creation of a flexible framework for managing the growth or decline of US operationally deployed nuclear weapons with, or without, arms control.^[8]

One challenge facing the US government and other estimators of China’s future nuclear capabilities is the lack of transparency in its declaratory policy about its nuclear deterrence strategy and force modernization plans. Will China opt for a so-called “minimum deterrent” based on a secure second strike capability or a more ambitious deterrent that would provide for various nuclear options across the spectrum of possible political, military, economic, and other targets? Should China be assumed to be planning for nuclear war against the United States and its allies or, as well, for possible conflict with Russia or India? How will China’s nuclear modernization overlap with improvements in its conventional forces for possible conflict with the United States over Taiwan?

Based on its prior experience, Chinese strategizing would treat issues of nuclear force modernization and nuclear deterrence within a more inclusive frame of reference that would privilege information-based deterrence and warfighting, together with non-military instruments of influence. China would see nuclear weapons as insurance against any attempt by the United States (or any other state for that matter) to defeat China in a conventional war or any attempt to use nuclear coercion against China as an instrument of influence. From this perspective, China would view the actual use of nuclear weapons as a last resort.

The Pentagon assesses that China intends to modernize its capabilities across all domains of warfare to conduct a full range of land, sea, air, space, counter-space, cyberspace, and nuclear warfare.^[9] China currently has about 500 nuclear warheads deployed on various ground-based, sea-based, and air-launched delivery systems. China has continued to expand its missile silo fields for both liquid fuel and solid fuel intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), developed new variants of ICBMs and advanced strategic delivery systems, expanded its dual-capable intermediate-range missile force, refitted ballistic missile submarines with the longer range JL-3 submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM), and recently reassigned an operational nuclear mission to its bomber force. China is also developing an air-launched ballistic missile with possible nuclear capability. Overall, China’s growing nuclear arsenal is among the largest and most rapid modernizations of the nine nuclear weapons states.^[10]

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Implications for arms control. Getting the United States and Russia on the same page for an immediate post-New START regime will be a demanding task requiring that Washington and Moscow improve their relations and agree on at least a provisional peace settlement for the war in Ukraine. Meanwhile, China will be reluctant to jump into negotiations about limits on nuclear weapons unless, or until, it has built its strategic nuclear forces to levels that are essentially equivalent to those of the United States and Russia. “Essentially equivalent” does not mean identical in force structure or military-operational doctrine. Past behavior suggests that China may not make nuclear threats as routinely as Russia has been doing since the war in Ukraine started. China, however, will be concerned about US missile defenses and whether they have the potential to nullify China’s second strike capability. A great leap forward in missile defenses by any of the strategic nuclear triumvirate creates a threat to strategic stability based on assured retaliation.

A third issue will be China’s approach to transparency, especially on issues of monitoring and verification necessary for viable arms control agreements. Here again, China may become more explicit about its nuclear forces as it closes in on matching the arsenals of the United States and Russia. An entirely open-ended arms race, however, would benefit none of the nuclear Big Three. Even though China is still a long way from transparency, Chinese leaders have demonstrated remarkable skills in economic competition, information warfare, scientific and technological innovation, and high-end diplomacy. It would not be a surprise to see China take a “reasonable sufficiency” approach to arms races in existing technologies while it leapfrogs into next-generation leadership in potentially disruptive technologies—artificial intelligence, big data, autonomous systems, military uses of space, and human-machine interfaces. The prospects for crisis stability under a tripartite post-New START regime are open-ended, but the case for arms race stability among China, Russia, and the United States is more problematical—and yet to be formulated.

The door remains open to ending the war in Europe, resuming Russian-US nuclear arms control, containing Iran’s nuclear ambitions, and including China as a nuclear superpower within a trilateral consensus on limiting the arms race. But the same door, swinging in the opposite direction, could yield continued war in Europe, an Iranian nuclear weapons state, and a Chinese outlier within the ranks of nuclear superpowers. Current US plans for nuclear modernization must provide the necessary military tools for maintaining nuclear deterrence stability well into the next decade. But military modernization should go hand in hand with astute and imaginative diplomacy and a commitment to peaceful settlement of disputes within an uncertain global geopolitical landscape.

Notes

[1] Vladimir Soldatkin, “Security hawk says Russia will take more steps up nuclear ‘ladder of escalation,’ Reuters, November 6, 2024, in Johnson’s Russia List 2024 – #232 – November 7, 2024, davidjohnson@starpower.net

[2] Zelensky, quoted in Mariana Budjeryn, “NATO or Nukes”: Why Ukraine’s nuclear revival refuses to die,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, November 1, 2024, https://thebulletin.org/2024/11/nato-or-nukes-why-ukraines-nuclear-revival-refuses-to-die/

[3] Madelyn Creedon and Jon Kyl, Co-Chairs, America’s Strategic Posture: The Final Report of the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States (Washington, D.C.: October, 2023), Executive Summary, viii, https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/America’s_Strategic_Posture_Auth_Ed.pdf

[4] U.S. Department of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China, Annual Report to Congress, 2023 (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 2023), VIII, https://media.defense.gov/2023/Oct/19/2003323409/-1/-1/1/2023-MILITARY-AND-SECURITY-DEVELOPMENTS-INVOLVING-THE-PEOPLES-REPUBLIC-OF-CHINA.PDF

[5] Robert Gates, quoted in David E. Sanger, New Cold Wars: China’s Rise, Russia’s Invasion, and America’s Struggle to Defend the West (New York: Crown Publishers, 2024), pp. 437-438.-

[6] Theresa Hitchens, “DOD ‘exploring’ options for nuclear buildup as part of strategic review,” Breaking Defense, August 1, 2024, https://breakingdefense.com/2024/08/dod-exploring-options-for-nuclear-buildup-as-part-of-strategic-review/, also in Johnson’s Russia List 2924 – #162 – August 2, 2024, davidjohnson@starpower.net

[7] Ibid.

[8] Curtis McGiffin and Adam Lowther, Dynamic Parity: A New Approach to American Nuclear Deterrence (Fairborn, Ohio: National Institute for Deterrence Studies, 2024), www.thinkdeterrence.com

[9] U.S. Department of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2023, p. IV.

[10] Hans M. Kristensen, Matt Korda, Eliana Johns, and Mackenzie Knight, “Chinese Nuclear Weapons, 2024,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 80:1, 49-72,: https://thebulletin.org/premium/2024-01/chinese-nuclear-weapons-2024/. See also: Mark B. Schneider, Current and Projected Growth of China’s Nuclear Arsenal (Fairfax, Va.: National Institute for Public Policy, Occasional Paper, Vol. 4, No. 10, October 2024), www.nipp.org)

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(Please note that the Sunday and Saturday NUCLEAR WORLD’S NEWS are also added below by category, following Monday’s news posts in order to maintain continuity of nuclear news as well as for research for the overall information provided in “LLAW;s All Things Nuclear”.)

There are 7 categories, with the latest addition, (#7) being a Friday weekly roundup of IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) global nuclear news stories. Also included is a bonus non-nuclear category for news about the Yellowstone caldera and other volcanic and caldera activity around the world that play an important role in humanity’s lives. The feature categories provide articles and information about ‘all things nuclear’ for you to pick from, usually with up to 3 links with headlines concerning the most important media stories in each category, but sometimes fewer and occasionally even none (especially so with the Yellowstone Caldera). The Categories are listed below in their usual order:

1. All Things Nuclear
2. Nuclear Power
3. Nuclear Power Emergencies
4. Nuclear War Threats
5. Nuclear War
6. Yellowstone Caldera (Note: There are three Yellowstone Caldera bonus stories available in today’s Post.)
7. IAEA Weekly News (Friday’s only)

Whenever there is an underlined link to a Category media news story, if you press or click on the link provided, you no longer have to cut and paste to your web browser, since this Post’s link will take you directly to the article in your browser.

A current Digest of major nuclear media headlines with automated links is listed below by nuclear Category (in the above listed order). If a Category heading does not appear in the daily news Digest, it means there was no news reported from this Category today. Generally, the three best articles in each Category from around the nuclear world(s) are Posted. Occasionally, if a Post is important enough, it may be listed in multiple Categories.

TODAY’s NUCLEAR WORLD’s NEWS, Thursday, (01/16/2025)

All Things Nuclear

NEWS

Interest in nuclear power is surging. Is it enough to build new reactors?

MIT Technology Review

Reopening old nuclear plants can only go so far. … This article is from The Spark, MIT Technology Review’s weekly climate newsletter. To receive it in …

Will the world fall in love with nuclear power once more? – National Observer

National Observer

Grist sat down with environmental journalist Marco Visscher to talk about his new book on the rise, fall, and return of nuclear.

New York State looks at a plan for greater possible use of nuclear energy as power …

WGRZ

The governor may have meant to say “reactors,” but she is clearly talking about nuclear power generation, as outlined in this newly released Blueprint …

Nuclear Power

NEWS

The Path to a New Era for Nuclear Energy – Analysis – IEA

International Energy Agency

However, nuclear energy is making a strong comeback, with rising investment, new technology advances and supportive policies in over 40 countries.

A new era for nuclear energy beckons as projects, policies and investments increase – News

iea.org

Nuclear power is set to reach a new record in 2025 and can improve energy security as electricity demand accelerates – but costs, project overruns …

Can nuclear energy expansion be a climate game changer? – DW

DW

Nuclear power is expected to hit record levels in 2025. Calling it “clean energy,” advocates are pushing for the power source to play a greater …

Nuclear Power Emergencies

NEWS

The Hydrogen Production Tax Credit Explained for Nuclear Power Plants

Department of Energy

Final rules provide clarity for incremental eligibility pathways for the nation’s nuclear power plants that meet certain criteria.

Nuclear War Threats

NEWS

A Second Grip on the Nuclear Football: Rethinking Sole Authority in a Volatile World

The Nuclear Threat Initiative

The ability to start a nuclear war—to potentially end life as we know … It is exactly the wrong response to today’s escalating nuclear threats.

Three nuclear policy challenges for the second Trump administration

Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists

… threats and dangers related to nuclear weapons, deterrence, and … war against Ukraine pose a continuing threat to US and Wn interests

US risks sliding into direct conflict with Russia — Trump’s CIA pick – The New Voice of Ukraine

The New Voice of Ukraine

John Ratcliffe, Trump’s pick for CIA Director, believes the war between Russia and Ukraine risks pulling in the United States. … nuclear power,” ..

Nuclear War

NEWS

A Second Grip on the Nuclear Football: Rethinking Sole Authority in a Volatile World

The Nuclear Threat Initiative

After President-elect Donald Trump takes the oath of office, President Biden’s designated military aide will hand the nuclear football off to …

Three nuclear policy challenges for the second Trump administration

Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists

However difficult, the Trump administration must work to end the war in Ukraine, contain Iran’s nuclear ambitions, and limit the arms race with …

Will Trump make nuclear war more likely? University of Leicester expert gives his view

University of Leicester

Professor Futter highlights a concern that Trump may undermine or weaken the US link with NATO – the political and military alliance of countries from …

Yellowstone Caldera

NEWS

Yellowstone is waking up after 160,000 years: We have a historic plan now – ECOticias.com

ECOticias.com

They also led to the formation of the present caldera, which characterizes the physical features of the Yellowstone National Park. While such …

In Yellowstone’s giant volcano crater, magma is on the move again – MSN

MSN

Site of half the world’s active geysers and about the same size as Cyprus, Yellowstone National Park’s scenery and wildlife make it one of the biggest …

Yellowstone geology year in review for 2024

Yellowstone Gate

There were no changes in ground deformation in 2024. Yellowstone Caldera continued to subside at a rate of a few centimeters (1–2 inches) per year, …