“End Nuclear Insanity Before Nuclear Insanity Ends Humanity” ~llaw
Sep 03, 2025
On My Mind Today:
I have written about the possibility or probability of nuclear terrorism several times, but not to the extent of actually considering the building and transporting of a nuclear bomb — or weapons of mass destruction — because the theft and delivery from or by a terrorist organization must first have a way to obtain uranium nuclear fuel, which would also require an existing terrorist organization — perhaps the one that would wear suits — in order to acquire the uranium fuel in order to build the bomb(s).
This scenario, from author Matt Caplan, Vesal Razavimaleki has used Iran as having a possible terrorist resident organization given the history of Iran’s right-or-wrong aspirations to build and use nuclear weapons against their enemies. But in reality, terrorist organizations could emerge from many other countries around the globe, including countries that already have nuclear weapons of mass destruction.
But the issue described in the article is a valid one, in some cases even now, and one that was recognized long ago — in 1939 by Albert Einstein and Leo Szilard that terrorists would have difficulty delivering nuclear warheads to countries and organizations they would want to attack, but it could be done . . . ~llaw

See the article from the “Bulletin of Atomic Scientists” for image description and photo credits . . . ~llaw
Nuclear terrorists wear suits: How Iran could build a nuclear weapon without state approval
By Matt Caplan, Vesal Razavimaleki | July 31, 2025

In 1939, Albert Einstein and Leo Szilard suggested that a nuclear weapon may be too heavy to be delivered by air, but could be brought into a port in a cargo container and detonated. Such a scenario is now feasible for aspiring nuclear terrorists in Iran. (Modified photo by Diego Cervo / depositphotos.com)
A nuclear terrorist does not match the profile of a suicide bomber or spree gunman. It’s not someone building a nuclear weapon in a cave from a box of scraps. A nuclear terrorist, rather, could be hiding in plain sight in a mid-tier government post.
Such a person could be active in Iran, right now, motivated to build an improvised nuclear weapon after an opportunity to steal weapon-usable uranium—enriched at 60 percent uranium 235—has just presented itself. This person could be emboldened by the absence of IAEA inspectors overseeing Iran’s known stockpile of fissile material.
Despite popular confusion about the nature of critical masses and what level of enrichment can be used for a weapon, a technical companion shows that as little as 40 kilograms of 60-percent-enriched uranium, representing only 10 percent of Iran’s stockpile, could be used to build a crude gun-type weapon like the “Little Boy” bomb that destroyed Hiroshima with an explosive yield of several kilotons. Such a weapon requires no further enrichment, greatly simplifying and fast-tracking construction.
The question, therefore, is not whether Iran can achieve its nuclear ambitions, but whether and how these can be realized by nuclear terrorists without state approval.
If not by air, then by cargo. In their letter to US President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Leo Szilard and Albert Einstein suggested that a nuclear weapon may be too heavy to be delivered by air, but could be brought into a port in a cargo container and detonated. Such a scenario is feasible for aspiring nuclear terrorists in Iran. While the technical hurdles of building a nuclear weapon have long been discussed, they may not be insurmountable to a well-resourced group of clandestine sub-state actors.
As of July 2025, publicly available intelligence was inconclusive about what remains of Iran’s enrichment capabilities and other nuclear assets following the June attacks by Israel and the United States on its nuclear facilities. Some experts have suggested, reasonably so from a tactical perspective, that Iran may have removed part of its enriched uranium stockpile from the Fordow underground enrichment facility and scattered it into multiple secret caches, perhaps even in otherwise innocuous non-military storage facilities, to prevent the United States and Israel from destroying the entire stockpile and equipment in a single decapitating strike. Although hypothetical, such caches could create as many opportunities to intercept material in transport as it would to recruit a co-conspirator to help steal some.
The radiation risks of Iran’s nuclear program, with or without a strike on Fordow
Where from inside the Iranian leadership? To understand how a mid-level official might take such actions, it is essential to examine the structure of power and ideology within the Islamic Republic.
The Islamic Republic of Iran is governed through a hybrid political-theocratic structure, ultimately ruled by Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. While formal executive, legislative, and judicial institutions exist, real power lies in unelected bodies and individuals loyal to the Supreme Leader. Among them, the Guardian Council vets all candidates for conformity to Islamic ideology, and the Assembly of Experts, a body of clerics, is officially supervisory to the Supreme Leader, but practically subservient to him.
The Supreme Leader also controls all major military and intelligence appointments, including the direct command of the IRGC, a parallel military and political institution separate from the traditional armed forces. Unlike the Iranian army, which is tasked with conventional defense and is generally apolitical, the IRGC is an ideological military organization that was formed after the 1979 revolution to protect the regime. Over the years, the IRGC has evolved into a sprawling enterprise with external and domestic military and intelligence branches, and also controls a vast array of holdings in all key sectors of the Iranian economy.
What for? The catastrophic loss of senior officials and infrastructure during the so-called “12-day war” between Israel, supported by the United States, and Iran in June was, for many regime insiders, not merely a military defeat but a profound humiliation. For some, this may have resulted in a loss of faith in the regime’s ideology, while for others, it could catalyze the initiative to take redemptive action and press ahead with building one or several nuclear weapons. A disillusioned, yet ideologically committed, IRGC officer might view unilateral action such as a nuclear attack against Israel as necessary to rekindle the revolutionary spirit of the late 1970s and reestablish the deterrence that preceded the October 7, 2023 attacks. With the regime losing face and at its weakest point in its 46-year history and recent progress in Iran’s nuclear technology and fissile material production, the risk is the highest now that one or a group of IRGC or Quds Force officers takes matters into their own hands. The conspirators need not be suicidal either. The international response to any nuclear terrorist attack would be certain to be devastating to the Iranian regime, even if it did not give explicit approval for such an operation. This could be an opportunity for conspirators to place the blame on the regime leadership, mount a coup, and take power in Iran.
What if Iran withdraws from the NPT?
A comprehensive coup need not be the motivation of a cabal, though. If the incentive is the return of glory to the regime establishment, the aspiring terrorists could offload liability to ideological partners within the regime’s proxies, such as Hezbollah, Hamas, or the Houthis. Like the regime in Iran, the leaders of these organizations are generally self-preserving; those who are not tend to be quickly replaced by those who are. As such, proxies may be hesitant to participate in such a scheme for fear that its success could destabilize their patron regime in Iran. However, there are certainly abundant middle-tier members who may have received their posts for ideological reasons and who may be more easily recruited by the cabal. The cabal may not necessarily have to take responsibility for all the technical challenges, such as uranium conversion, material acquisition and machining, and weapon delivery. Small numbers of technicians with access to relatively common industrial equipment could handle most of the work, and could be bribed, deceived, or placed under duress to do so if they are not ideologically driven to participate.
These conspirators and their motivations are completely imagined. But the opportunity for a nuclear terrorist to siphon uranium from Iranian stockpiles is very real, and may be the greatest risk of nuclear terrorism ever encountered. This risk could be reduced significantly with robust IAEA access to the known Iranian stockpile: The earlier any missing uranium is detected, the less any sort of nuclear terrorist scheme would likely succeed.
ABOUT THE FOLLOWING ACCESS TO “LLAW’s All Nuclear Daily Digest” RELATED MEDIA”:
There are 7 categories, including a bonus non-nuclear category for news about the Yellowstone caldera and other volcanic and caldera activity around the world that also play an important role in the survival of human and other life.
The feature categories provide articles and information about ‘all things nuclear’ for you to pick from, usually with up to 3 links with headlines concerning the most important media stories in each category, but sometimes fewer and occasionally even none (especially so with the Yellowstone Caldera). The Categories are listed below in their usual order:
- All Things Nuclear
- Nuclear Power
- Nuclear Power Emergencies
- Nuclear War Threats
- Nuclear War
- Yellowstone Caldera (Note: There is one Yellowstone Caldera bonus story available in today’s Post.)
- IAEA News (Friday’s only)
A current Digest of major nuclear media headlines with automated links is listed below by nuclear Category (in the above listed order). If a Category heading does not appear in the daily news Digest, it means there was no news reported from this Category today. Generally, the three best articles in each Category from around the nuclear world(s) are Posted. Occasionally, if a Post is important enough, it may be listed in multiple Categories.
TODAY’S ALL NUCLEAR WORLD’s NEWS, Wednesday, (09/03/2025)
All Things Nuclear
NEWS
It’s past time to start protecting US nuclear power reactors from drones
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists
… nuclear plants here and overseas. RELATED: DOGE’s staff firing fiasco at the nuclear weapon agency means everything but efficiency. Meanwhile, the …
The Nuclear Force Requirements of a Protracted Conventional War
The Heritage Foundation
… nuclear-armed ALCM. For this reason, a penetrating stealth platform carrying a B61 remains, all things considered, a preferable option to signal …
Man sets record straight on common misconception about nuclear energy: ‘It’s super clean’
Yahoo
Compare that to coal or gas, which release millions of tons of ash, mercury, and other pollutants into the air and water every year. Advertisement.
Nuclear Power
NEWS
Russia says it will help China overtake the United States on nuclear power – Yahoo
Yahoo
… nuclear power, the chief of Russia’s Rosatom state nuclear corporation said in comments broadcast on state TV on Wednesday after talks in Beijing …
Russia says it will help China overtake the United States on nuclear power | Reuters
Reuters
China is racing to build dozens of reactors though and had 53.2 GW of operating nuclear power reactor capacity as of April 2024, according to the U.S. …
Satellite photos show intense work at Dimona nuclear reactor site, AP reports
The Times of Israel
They told the Associated Press it could be a new reactor or a facility to assemble nuclear arms — but secrecy shrouding the program makes it difficult …
Nuclear Power Emergencies
NEWS
Rethinking transmission policy for an energy emergency – Utility Dive
Utility Dive
While a bidding process is often presumed to deliver consumer benefits, bidding efforts for transmission have not followed that pattern.
Shelter-in-Place | Emergency Management | Public Safety – William & Mary
William & Mary
These include such incidents as a tornado warning, a radiation release from Surry Nuclear Power Plant, a hazardous material spill or a violent person.
Military IL-76 makes emergency landing at Krasnoyarsk airport – PHOTO / VIDEO
Caliber.Az
A Russian military transport aircraft, an IL-76, has made an emergency landing at Cheremshanka Airport in Krasnoyarsk … nuclear power capacity, …
Nuclear War Threats
NEWS
Nuclear dangers resurface amid rising tensions | Kuwait Times Newspaper
Kuwait Times
Since the end of World War II, nuclear … What is alarming today, however, is the shift from implicit deterrence to open and explicit nuclear threats.
China Unveils New Nuclear Missiles for ‘Global’ Reach – Newsweek
Newsweek
Beijing claimed at the time that the event was part of its training plan. Faced with the evolving nuclear missile threat from China, Russia and North …
Rethinking the Threat: Why China is Unlikely to Invade Taiwan – Stimson Center
Stimson Center
… Threats and Diplomatic Pressure Against Taiwan,” New Release, Mainland … Likewise, the risk of conflict escalating to nuclear war with the U.S. is …
Nuclear War
NEWS
The Nuclear Force Requirements of a Protracted Conventional War
The Heritage Foundation
The United States needs a nuclear posture that can credibly deter limited, non-strategic nuclear war without either forcing it to escalate to …
China’s parade of new weaponry sends message of deterrence – Reuters
Reuters
From an upgraded, nuclear-armed missile with near-global reach, to air … War Two, in Beijing, China, September 3, 2025. REUTERS/Tingshu …
China’s New DF-61 Intercontinental Ballistic Missile Breaks Cover – The War Zone
The War Zone
China has reportedly been developing new generation ICBMs for years now amid a larger buildup of its nuclear arsenal.
Yellowstone Caldera
NEWS
Modernizing Geologic Mapping In Yellowstone: The Role Of Geodatabases In The Field
National Parks Traveler
Editor’s note: Yellowstone Caldera Chronicles is a weekly column written by scientists and collaborators of the Yellowstone Volcano Observatory.

